

Environmental Groups: What Political Science Has to Offer

Lawrence S. Rothenberg
Department of Political Science
University of Rochester

Paper prepared for conference, "What do NGOs Want?," Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise, University of Michigan.

Abstract

Political Scientists have emphasized the creation, internal organization, and the ability of environmental NGOs to impact policy choices. With respect to initial mobilization, Political Scientists have particularly stressed the irregular historical pattern of NGO creation, the innovative means adopted by these NGOs and their leaders to get off the ground, and the competitive market in which these NGOs operate. Per their internal organization and goals, Political Science has tended to link such choices—such as a preference for concentrating decision-making in the hands of a few—to the need to raise resources in light of free riding incentives and competition. Where the findings of Political Science are most troubling is with respect to assessing NGO influence on policy outcomes, where there is no consensus that NGOs are consistently influential, with much of the most convincing research indicating only moderate impacts at most. One, but not the only, possible reason for such modest results for influence is that the choices made are constrained by maintenance considerations. Drawing attention to the potential linkages of mobilization, internal affairs, and efforts to be influential is likely Political Scientists' biggest contribution in helping to understand environmental NGOs. Where Political Scientists might think of expanding their purview is with respect to strategic transboundary choices that NGOs have and, especially, how NGOs are increasingly differentiating themselves by turning to the market rather than relying on government.

Environmental NGOs: What Political Science Has to Offer

The twelve largest environmental organizations [in the United States] have total budgets of nearly \$2 billion. Environmental organizations have also developed close working relations with labor unions, civil rights organizations, and other powerful groups. The environmental movement is now part of the political establishment. (Schoenbrod 2005, p. 134)

Distilling what Political Science has to say about environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which Political Scientists would typically label environmental interest groups, is a formidable task. While environmental organizations have long been studied, especially in the American context, coming up with generalities about what useful knowledge has been garnered is another story.¹

¹ Caveat emptor: I principally study environmental policies and interest organizations in America. However, I will try to reference findings and frameworks used by those concentrating elsewhere geographically, particularly other advanced industrial democracies and the European Union. Also, my focus will largely be on groups typically associated with efforts to ameliorate environmental ills, as this is routinely what Political Scientists have in mind when discussing environmental NGOs. As such, I will not concentrate on groups with broad portfolios that may touch upon environmental issues, on so-called astroturf groups (e.g., Lyon and Maxwell 2004) that are set-up with the intent of misrepresenting a group's public mission, or on groups that are more or less directly oriented toward the business world (e.g., CERES).

There are at least three related reasons why this chore is so daunting. One is that Political Science is a notorious arbitrager of other disciplines—Economics and Sociology most notably for the study of NGOs. Thus, establishing clear boundaries between Economics and Political Science, for example, is quite hard to do. Not only do Political Scientists studying NGOs often shamelessly export economic models and ideas to their home discipline (present company included, e.g., Rothenberg 2002; Kim and Rothenberg 2007) but Economists increasingly cross over into Political Science, e.g., publishing in the latter's journals or in interdisciplinary journals designed for just such purposes as well as producing relevant monographs (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 2001). An analogous comparison can be made with respect to the blurry line between Political Science and Sociology (e.g., Heinz, Laumann, Salisbury, and Nelson 1993). Nevertheless, there is a mainstream Political Science literature on interest groups generally and on environmental NGOs specifically which will form the foundation for my discussion here.

Second, particularly relative to Economics, Political Science is highly fragmented, by both subfield and by methodological approach and orientation. Thus, as mentioned, on the one hand, the study of environmental NGOs, as is the analysis of interest organizations by Political Scientists more broadly, is typically dominated by students focusing on American politics and policy. There are several reasons for such a concentration—environmental activism tends to be concentrated in the first world to start with (e.g., Dalton 2005) and the American political system, given its separation of powers and its weak political parties (note the absence of a viable Green Party) relative to much of the rest of the developed world, appears ready-made for group influence over government decision-making (e.g., Moe and Caldwell 1994). In terms of numbers and

diversity, it is only recently that Europe, particularly the European Union (EU), has seemingly been catching up.² On the other hand, the investigation of political organizations broadly is also influenced by methodological splits, most notably between those employing more deductive approaches relative to those who are more inductively oriented. There is little agreement even on what constitutes a theory or on what makes for knowledge's advancement. In a related vein, empirical students of organized groups quite frequently disagree on how knowledge is better accrued, by studying one or a small number of groups or by engaging in large-scale data collection. Using the former offers the opportunity of measuring variables in a manner that is more likely to make closely analyzing deductive theoretical results, such as comparative statics, possible; employing the latter strategy produces findings that are not easily critiqued as reflecting the

² It is interesting to note that, even while not converging completely, descriptions of the role that groups play in the EU—where the bulk of environmental policy is now made for member nation-states—are coming to approximate those for groups in the American political system (e.g., Mahoney 2005). Although much traditional literature on groups in Western Europe focused on features such as the tendency to have large, overarching, consociations, discussions of the EU highlight NGO diversity and tactical decision-making. The reason for this seems straightforward; namely that, even though there is a lack of direct electoral accountability in the EU, decision-making authority in Brussels is extremely fragmented as is authority in the U.S., encouraging similar kinds of organizational mobilization and activities.

idiosyncratic elements of the context, groups, or choices under consideration (e.g., Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Lowery and Gray 2004).³

Third, and certainly related to the first two points, scholars have been conspicuously negative regarding the progress that Political Science has made in studying NGOs. Reflecting this, two of the leading Political Science scholars have recently lamented, “while seemingly never well endowed with theory *and* data, we surely have an endless supply of pessimism” (Lowery and Gray 2004, p. 163). As we will discuss, perhaps the most notable example of such frustration is the difficulty that scholars have had in assessing group influence: Whether, net of NGO activity, policy outputs would have been different.

Having said all of this, my discussion will, nonetheless, attempt to concentrate on what Political Scientists know with respect to environmental groups specifically and to provide a useful synthesis.⁴ Although analyses are varied, I will roughly follow the roadmap laid out by one well-known student of environmental NGOs, who states that Political Scientists tend to focus on “environmental group mobilization [i.e., how groups

³ See the interchange between Austen-Smith and Wright (1996) and Baumgartner and Leech (1996a,b) for an example of a vigorous debate between these two perspectives.

⁴ While I will focus on literature on environmental NGOs as much as is feasible, I will also reference Political Science works on interest groups generally and on citizen groups (where membership is not tied to one’s profession or economic position) generally (for discussions concluding that environmental NGOs and other advocacy organizations are largely similar, see Walker 1991, Grossmann 2006a).

are created], organizational maintenance, agendas, tactics, and resources” (Bosso 2004, p. 255).

When considered *in toto*, if there is a theme to what we may learn from research to date, it is that Political Scientists best help us understand environmental NGOs by highlighting the potential linkages between mobilization, internal affairs, and efforts to be influential. In other words, to understand the role of NGOs, it is necessary to integrate the factors that cause environmental organizations to form, induce contributions from all variety of sources, institute specific kinds of internal structures and adopt goals, and arrive at tactical choices that may or may not influence policy outcomes. Most notably, there is little systematic evidence that environmental NGOs are consistently effective (and, if they are, it is at the margins) and, one, but not the only, possible reason for such modest results with respect to influence is that choices made are constrained by mobilization and maintenance considerations.

At the same time, Political Scientists, given their intrinsic propensity to examine choice behavior relative to a given set of formal political institutions, might think of expanding their purview in at least two ways. One is to recognize that, with the increasing growth of multinational firms and international trade, environmental NGOs—particularly those stretching national boundaries themselves—may have strategic transboundary choices. In other words, environmental NGOs may be able to pick the best political context to achieve their stated goals (e.g., Baron 2006) or to maintain themselves *qua* organizations. Another is to incorporate an increasingly important part of what at least a subset of environmental groups do, which is going directly to the market to engage in what Baron (e.g., 2001, 2003; see also Baron and Diermeier forthcoming)

has aptly labeled private politics. Where Political Scientists might be able to contribute to this line of research is by examining the trade-off between public and private initiatives using their contextual knowledge of organizational formation and maintenance, the selection of goals and choice of tactics, and the like.

Thus, the remainder of this overview will begin with an analysis of, for want of a better term, environmental group mobilization. I will then turn to discussions of organizational goals and maintenance, followed by an analysis of NGO tactics and, ultimately, influence. Before concluding, I will touch on the kinds of additional considerations that Political Scientists might think about in the future.

Environmental NGO Mobilization

Not surprisingly, the standard starting point for analyses of interest groups generally and of environmental NGOs specifically is to explain why they emerge in the first place. Such discussions typically highlight the previously mentioned different conceptual and methodological approaches that Political Scientists often bring to the table.

There is a certain irony to many such studies, as often times as much effort is seemingly spent saying what is wrong with past perspectives as is expended on what actually explains NGO creation. Frequently, a discussion is initiated with a reference to David Truman's (1951) so-called disturbance theory, stating why it is wrong, followed by a contrast with Mancur Olson's (1965) collective action logic, suggesting that it is

erroneous as well (e.g., Nownes and Neeley 1996a,b; Baumgartner and Leech 2004), and concluding with the offering of some hybridized or otherwise augmented solution.⁵

Although he had his predecessors, Truman's work on pluralism is that which is most associated with the idea that NGOs emerge to represent a myriad of natural, common, interests via a variety of potential upheavals, be they social, technological, economic, or political.⁶ By contrast, Olson's analysis is that most connected to the claim that it will be highly problematical for those with diffuse interests to form groups without the provision of sufficiently valuable private, selective, rewards to those joining to prevent free riding.⁷

⁵ One might object to including Olson's analysis into this discussion, as Olson was an Economist rather than a Political Scientist. However, as Olson's logic entered the mainstream of Political Science analyses of NGOs decades ago (e.g., Lowery and Gray 2004), indeed it is prominent in every text surveying interest and citizen groups consulted for this overview, it bears discussion here.

⁶ The enduring reach of Truman's research is reflected in the variety of contemporary scholars who have tried to fashion what they call a neopluralist perspective which they view as also incorporating changes in the last half century in the study and behavior of NGOs (e.g., Baumgartner and Leech 2004, Gray and Lowery 2004, McFarland 2004, Grossmann 2006b).

⁷ It is possible to specify a micro-level model in which the formation of large, sustainable, environmental NGOs is an equilibrium phenomenon; for example, Barbieri and Mattozzi (2004) represent an example of just such an effort. However, such

The reasons for stressing the Truman/Olson juxtaposition for understanding NGO formation are probably intuitive. On the one hand, the inherent persuasiveness of Olson's logic, and the obvious difference between citizen preferences and behavior regarding policies generally and environmental policies specifically, seems to negate Truman's view that group formation is natural. It is certainly the case, for instance, that the citizenry's support for the erstwhile causes of environmental NGOs is a far cry from what a literal reading of citizenry opinion would suggest (on attitudes with respect to the environment, see, e.g., Dalton 1994, Ladd and Bowman 1995, Rothenberg 2002, Guber 2003). For example, 70 percent of all Americans responding to a Gallup Poll in mid-March 2007 believe that global warming "is causing a serious impact now" and 75 percent favor "imposing mandatory controls on carbon dioxide emissions and other greenhouse gases," which translates into well in excess of 150 million Americans over the age of 18 (the sample's definition) believing that the current policy status quo is far from their ideal point.⁸ Even a cursory examination of the NGO universe makes it clear that NGO activism on such issues is, at best, a pale reflection of such shared interests.

technically high-end game theoretic models by Economists have not had much resonance with Political Scientists studying NGOs.

⁸ Results and exact wording of these poll questions are available at www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm. Other polling, such as that done by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy (<http://www.yale.edu/envirocenter/environmentalpoll.htm>), claims even stronger support for activism regarding global warming.

Yet, the fact that environmental NGOs are formed with millions in aggregate membership, and with the most prominent organizations enjoying very long lifetimes and substantial budgets while offering relatively modest private benefits, seems antithetical in spirit to Olson's free riding logic.⁹ Indeed, environment groups have been recognized as the fastest growing group segment among U.S. citizen groups (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). While many of these environmental NGOs provide small selective rewards—a magazine, some initial gifts for joining, opportunities to purchase other goods, etc.—it is not credible to say that the rewards by themselves are sufficient for most who actually join by voluntarily making small contributions of time or money.¹⁰ Furthermore, group formation and support is discontinuous in time, occurring in waves à la Truman (on formation patterns, see, e.g., Walker 1991; on support patterns, see, e.g., Hansen 1985, Bosso 2005). Thus, for instance, creation of American environmental NGOs has occurred in bunches (Bosso 2005). There were NGOs formed in the late nineteenth

⁹ Regarding the long lifetimes of environmental NGOs, an accepted descriptive fact is that the only major environmental organization to fail within memory is Environmental Action (Shaiko 1999; Bosso 2005). This would seem to contrast significantly with other kinds of voluntary groups (e.g., Nownes and Lipinski 2005). However, it may be that there are smaller NGOs that never become entrenched which do fail.

¹⁰ Illustratively, in his survey of the selective rewards (using a fairly broad definition) offered by 61 U.S. environmental groups, Johnson (1998) found that 58 groups provided a magazine or similar materials, 44 had group-related goods for sale, 23 had the opportunity to join grassroots efforts, 18 sponsored wilderness outings, and 17 offered a group credit card.

century to push progressive policies, interwar (World War I and II) groups focused on recreation and utilization of natural resources, post-World War II conservationist interests, and a flurry of organizations associated with environmentalism's increased profile in the late 1960s and early 1970s.¹¹

In response, Political Scientists have taken several different approaches. One has been to largely eschew the study of individual-level choice behavior and to focus on NGO creation or existence as the unit of analysis. Such studies, often borrowing heavily from Sociological works on organizational ecology that are themselves rooted in Biological studies of ecology, concentrate on the conditions that foster more or less group activity.¹² Some research in this vein has included consideration of how political institutions themselves create conditions to make group formation more likely or how policy change itself occurs irregularly (e.g., Mahoney 2004, Repetto 2006), presumably spurring NGO activity. Other analyses emphasize the idea that niches in group systems have, essentially, a steady-state carrying capacity given constituent interests (e.g., Lowery and Gray 1995, Gray and Lowery 1996). Many of the results from this corpus may be reconceptualized as, while not necessarily highlighting the reasons for why groups form per se, demonstrating that environmental NGOs are often placed in vigorous competition with their brethren and must adapt to sustain themselves (e.g., Jordan and Maloney 1997; Bosso 2003, 2005). As we will discuss further, the results generally

¹¹ As we will discuss, many of these NGOs have changed their focus with time.

¹² None of this work, to my knowledge, focuses directly on environmental NGOs, but it has been applied to other kinds of voluntary citizen groups (e.g., Gray and Lowry 1996, Nownes 2004).

suggest that there is a demand for groups filling certain niches and that the NGO market is quite dynamic. However, in and of themselves, such studies cannot directly explain what motivates those creating or contributing to NGOs, as these analyses lack a compelling micro-level foundation and many can be critiqued as suffering from endogeneity problems (a typical difficulty with much Political Science research on NGOs).

Other scholars have focused on augmenting individual-level explanations for group formation and, by extension, for maintenance. Some have simply concentrated on stressing factors beyond selective incentives that might induce at least nominal contributions, such as purposive rewards that tap the warm glow feeling associated with contributing to a worthy cause or the solidary benefits garnered from interacting with, typically, like-minded individuals (for applications to environmental NGOs, see Jordan and Maloney 1997, Shaiko 1999). Others have ventured a bit farther by identifying what features are related to greater willingness to act. For example Lowry (1998) examines how environmental group membership is conditioned by religious beliefs, finding that Judeo-Christianity tends to reduce membership in most environmental organizations (see also Guth, Green, Kellstedt, and Smidt 1995).¹³ More commonly, scholars emphasize demographic factors which induce environmental membership—not surprisingly, most environmental activism is by those who are relatively well-off and educated (e.g., Shaiko 1999, Dalton 2005)—and psychological attitudes, notably feelings of efficacy (e.g., Moe

¹³ It would be interesting to examine whether this analysis, using data from the early 1990s, would be replicated given more contemporary emphases by religious leaders on environmental progressivity.

1980; Ainsworth 2000; Lubell 2002; Lubell *et al.*, 2006) and of impending threat or opportunity (e.g., Miller and Krosnick 2004). Additionally, although not explaining membership directly, others have focused on technological features, such as the advent of direct mail initially and internet recruitment subsequently, which effectively reduces the costs to an embryonic or existing group in attracting members relative to what was the case previously (e.g., Shaiko 1999, Bosso and Collins 2002, Bosso 2005).

Beyond such analyses, a significant number of scholars have concentrated on actors who are not in the rank and file: leaders taking the initiative to organize NGOs or so-called patrons providing seed money to get a group off the ground (many of whom also provide ongoing support or funding for specific projects). As for leaders, there is a variety of research that pinpoints the ability of talented entrepreneurs both to develop a group in a skillful way which meets potential member demands and to find access to requisite capital (e.g., Salisbury 1969; Berry 1977; Nownes and Neeley 1996a,b). Some analyses examine the motivations of these entrepreneurs, such as whether they are trying to make themselves wealthy or are attempting to achieve political goals, and typically conclude that the vast majority of leaders are spurred by the desire to effect policy outcomes rather than to get rich (e.g., Lowry 1997). One obvious critique of this work generally, as in much Political Science research on environmental NGOs, is the lack of a comparison group. We would like to be able to say that there is more NGO creation when the pool of high quality leaders rises exogenously. But defining the universe of possible high and low quality leaders at any given point in time or specifying a selection model regarding what motivates those in each set to act is problematic. Thus, many studies concluding that entrepreneurs matter tend to use the “last person standing”

research design—if group formation cannot be linked to either some outside actor willing to finance the operation (e.g., the Pew Trust) or to an obvious external reason for group formation (e.g., an accident at Three Mile Island motivating anti-nuclear NGOs) at a given time, then the presence of a high quality entrepreneur must explain what is observed by default.

As mentioned, the other factor that scholars have regularly emphasized is the willingness of some institutional or individual actor(s) to provide required capital to get an NGO off the ground. While such contributors are essentially large or privileged members in Olson's terminology, in the sense that they give enough to impact the provision of the collective good and, presumably, value the good highly, as they are often not formal members of the organization such donors are known in Political Science parlance as patrons (e.g., on the importance of patrons generally, see, e.g., Walker 1991; on their importance for environmental NGOs, see, e.g., Lowry 1997, 1999; Nownes and Cigler 2007). While not always the case, there are numerous instances when outside interests, notably foundations but also corporations, governments, and individuals, willingly provide funds to jump start environmental NGOs, to sustain them, or to initiate specific projects (Rothenberg 2002, Bosso 2005).¹⁴ Consider, for example, the World Wildlife Fund's summary of its recent financial position, and note that only 27 percent of its funds actually come from WWF members:

¹⁴ As implied, such patron support is also typically behind astroturf groups that purport to be like any other environmentally-oriented NGO but are designed to advance specific private interests.

Our revenue base remained strong in FY 2005, with \$32.4 million in support from WWF members and \$13.6 million in vital support from major donors and Partners in Conservation. Government awards totaled \$28.1 million, with an additional \$13.8 million from foundations, \$12.5 million from WWF network organizations, and \$3.3 million from corporations. Healthy investment returns of 13.8 percent, along with bequest and endowment revenue, contributed another \$14.4 million to our efforts.

http://worldwildlife.org/about/2005_report/pdfs/2005AR_Financials.pdf

To conclude this section by returning to the underlying motivation for this discussion, for those wishing to understand environmental NGOs, perhaps the most important contributions made by Political Scientists in their studies of mobilization are twofold. First, they underscore the importance of, and the means by which, environmental NGOs go about finding innovative ways of gathering resources to launch themselves.¹⁵ Second, they highlight both that environmental NGOs operate in a competitive political market and that, nonetheless, at least the major NGOs have been successful in developing means of adapting to the market pressures that they confront. While competitive advantage may only be a short-term phenomenon, as we will discuss in more depth in the next section, environmental NGOs have been quite successful in remaking themselves. These Political Science contributions, in turn, suggest several

¹⁵ There are other mechanisms, less important in practice, by which some NGOs can raise funds, such as selling goods or endorsing corporate products.

additional things to consider, such as whether the joining calculus and the means of funding impact organizational structures and goals and whether the ability of NGOs to sustain themselves is reflected in their decisions with respect to NGO structure, objectives, and tactics.

NGO Maintenance: Organization and Goals

The second broad area that Political Scientists have paid attention to is how NGOs maintain themselves. To reiterate, one of the features that scholars have emphasized regarding environmental NGOs is their staying power, so one topic that has garnered attention is what explains this longevity given changing competitive contexts and the waxing and waning of relevant issues. In a related vein, as foreshadowed, while we lack comprehensive data on the death of small or newly created environmental NGOs, the emphasis of some Political Scientists on the determinants of organizational death (e.g., Nownes and Lapinski 2005) does not have much resonance when it comes to the environmental arena. In short, measured by either existence or resource growth, environmental NGOs seem to be doing something right.¹⁶ The question that this raises is whether—and, if so, how—the maintenance imperative is reflected in organizational structure and goals?

As the last section implies, and since quite obviously the most proximate key to maintaining an NGO is to keep funds flowing, to a large extent any discussion of how

¹⁶ As mentioned, environmental NGOs have often seen their resource levels waxing and waning (for example, many in the U.S. did better in the 1980s than in the 1990s (Bosso 2005)) but not to the point of threatening organizational death in many instances and with a long-term upward trajectory.

Political Scientists approach NGO maintenance stems straightforwardly from an analysis of mobilization.¹⁷ Maintenance involves continuing and developing support from individuals, governments, foundations, firms, and the like.

Having said this, there are two specific areas that Political Scientists have commented on that, while related to NGO mobilization, deserve elaboration. One is how internal processes within NGOs are structured—particularly with respect to leadership and policy selection— and impact the goals that NGOs focus upon.¹⁸ A second is how environmental NGOs have expanded in terms of tactical repertoire, ideological positions, and issue considerations, in a manner that establishes different niches and, presumably, appealing to different constituencies.

Organizational Structure: Concentrated Decision-Making, Internal Democracy, and NGO Goals

For Political Scientists, the first, and perhaps the most obvious, way in which the maintenance imperative is reflected is in tendency for group decision-making authority to

¹⁷ We should note, however, that environmental NGO goal setting and internal organization have not gotten the same attention as the determinants of contribution choices or the role of patrons on the one hand or efforts to influence policy on the other.

¹⁸ Other internal organizational features of NGO (e.g., whether to have a federated structure), have not been analyzed very much with respect to issues of maintenance (but see Moe 1980), although they are sometimes included in discussions of which tactics groups adopt in trying to mold policy and what makes NGOs influential (e.g., Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004, Heaney 2006).

be concentrated and for organizational democracy to be lacking. Most notably, viable electoral mechanisms are rare.¹⁹

Not surprisingly, Political Scientists tend to be interested in elections and to have a normative preference for vigorous electoral competition over one-sided contests. Furthermore, they often seem to adopt the implicit assumption that, given that the stated mission of the typical environmental NGO is providing public goods and addressing negative externalities, rather than generating private rewards, NGO leaders should be facilitators of vigorous internal democracy. This might seem particularly intuitive for mass membership environmental NGOs, where formal membership provides the rank and file with private benefits that are seemingly outstripped by the, albeit typically modest, price for basic membership (many do give more). In turn, assuming majoritarian [supermajoritarian] procedures are adopted, this would suggest that organizational goals would simply reflect the preferences of the median [supermajoritarian] voter.

Alas, scholars that have spent time examining the role of elections and democratic processes in NGOs have typically come away disappointed. What they discover is a lack of classic democratic processes in operation. Some groups employ formal democratic procedures but, in practice, there is not much in the way of competition and/or participation regardless of what the bylaws state.

¹⁹ Nor are other formal mechanisms often substituted. Johnson (1998) finds that, of 61 NGO membership groups, only 13 provide members an opportunity to participate in meetings that determine the organization's political strategy and the same number provide members an opportunity to participate in meetings that change the group's bylaws or organizational structure

Thus, the standard Political Science textbook conclusion is that, while many NGOs have democratic procedures on the books, these groups are almost always oligarchic in practice (e.g., Ainsworth 2002, Berry and Wilcox 2007). By oligarchy, Political Scientists emphasize that small groups dominate decision-making and leadership turnover rarely is a function of anything approximating a vision of pure democracy. Indeed, it is not surprising that journalists and other critics of environmental groups periodically contend that, at least implicitly, this lack of simple accountability procedures results in environmental group leaders engaging in self-aggrandizing behaviors and otherwise running amok. This was the theme, for example, in a dramatic three-part exposé by the *Washington Post* in 2003 detailing alleged abuses by the Nature Conservancy.²⁰ Interestingly enough, the Conservancy, while objecting to the *Post*

²⁰ For the full *Post* series, see

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/nation/specials/natureconservancy.com> and, for the Conservancy's response, see <http://nature.org/pressroom/links/art10505.html> (see also Birchard 2005).

Interestingly, even more radicalized environmental groups often make such allegations about their more moderate peers. For example, Earth First! asks potential supporters the following:

Are you tired of namby-pamby environmental groups? Are you tired of overpaid corporate environmentalists who suck up to bureaucrats and industry? Have you become disempowered by the reductionist approach of

portrayal, reformed itself by, among other things, making its Board meet more frequently, appointed a Chief Compliance Officer, and establishing a policy facilitating whistleblowing. None of these, clearly, are directly related to strengthening democratic procedures.

In contrast to such journalistic accounts, however, Political Scientists do not typically stress leadership's avarice and irresponsibility. Indeed, to reiterate, they usually conclude that entrepreneurs in citizen groups are interested in achieving public policy goals and not personal financial gain (e.g., Rothenberg 1992, Cigler and Nownes 1995). Rather, Political Scientists stress that oligarchy is a function of factors associated with leadership incentives to sustain the group, the reasons for providing resources to an NGO, and the very nature of volunteerism. The resulting inferences are that even a dedicated environmental NGO leader would not want to adopt anything close to pure democratic processes in practice and that events such as leadership elections will typically not be very meaningful.

To elaborate on the logic behind such declarations, first consider voluntary contributions. The inherent nature of such support in a context where there is a great deal of competition—as is typical in the environmental NGO community—would suggest that most people who continue to be supporters are happy with the status quo at the NGO (e.g., Sabatier and McLaughlin 1990, Rothenberg 1992). Those who are unhappy will tend to move out of the group to either allocate their resources to competing NGOs or to keep them for private uses. In the extreme case when those who are dissatisfied are

environmental professionals and scientists?

<http://www.earthfirst.org/about.htm>

leaders, such as former Sierra Club head David Brower, they may even go off and form their own group(s) (as Brower did with Friends of the Earth, the League of Conservation Voters, and the Earth Island Institute). If for no other reason than the dynamics of selection, then, we would not expect to see highly contested elections. Just as firms have an incentive to cultivate customers by establishing a strong reputation, leaders have a strong reason to keep the membership happy despite the lack of an electoral incentive.

Additionally, given the contribution calculus, leaders will have a disincentive to establish a viable “one person, one vote” rule that would effectively impact key features of the NGO (e.g., Rothenberg 1992). They will want to treat members of the NGO differently depending on the levels of resources provided and the likelihood that contributions will be withdrawn or increased in response to strategic choices made. Also, to the extent that the NGO relies on resources from non-members, i.e., patrons, leaders will have a motive not to listen to those who might put the provision of such support at risk. Put differently, there is an incentive to be more responsive to those who provide more, are most likely to change their level of support, and do not put other funding sources in harm’s way.

Additionally, related to the idea of oligarchy, the low information of members will further decrease the attractiveness of vigorous democracy (e.g., Truman 1951, Nownes 2001). At a minimum, allowing rank and file contributors to have substantial input can be inefficient either because they will make poor choices or they will have to be educated at substantial cost (and members could find the education process a source of annoyance rather than something generating gratitude). Potentially even more problematic is that, net of incurring the expense of educating members, an NGO could

leave itself open to considerable manipulation by those interested in organizational power or resources.

Finally, social choice theorists have also demonstrated that direct democracy may cause problems of NGO unraveling. Specifically, direct democracy might force some members out of a group, inducing a new policy that will force still others to leave, and so on (e.g., Johnson 1987, 1990; Ainsworth 2002). Although there may be ways to circumvent unraveling, the possibility of it may nonetheless give leaders incentive not to encourage an electoral system that would amount to a de facto referendum on key organizational policies (e.g., Ainsworth 2002). This can be accomplished, for example, by controlling the agenda of what members are allowed to vote on directly and by structuring the means by which candidates can get on the ballot to run for group office if electoral systems are employed.

Hence, it is not surprising given this litany of incentives that analyses of internal politics almost always conclude that decision-making is concentrated. In a related vein, despite the patina of democracy, votes for group leaders, when they exist, tend to result in overwhelming supermajorities. Even when there are exceptions, closer examination suggests that the depiction offered above is not too far off.

For such an example, consider the peculiar case of the Sierra Club and immigration. The Sierra Club is unusually democratic, in that there is a 15 person board, with 5 members elected per year, and there is competition for seats. However, elections have traditionally had quite low turnout (despite the ability to vote by internet as well as mail) and candidates typically come from a pool of long-time activists (Martin 2004). Over time, immigration has been an issue that has occasionally popped up on the group's

agenda (Meyerson 2004). Advocates of the organization taking an anti-immigrant stance with respect to U.S. policy have asserted that rising population is an environmental threat, while those believing that the group should not take a strong stance point out, among other things, that overpopulation is a global problem and keeping individuals out of the United States only redistributes population. In 1998, a group of anti-immigration activists known as SUSPS introduced a ballot referendum to get the Club to oppose immigration but it lost, and the Club adopted a “neutrality policy” concerning population growth and immigration, i.e., immigration would be defused as a policy (Reiser 2006).

However, SUSPS remained dissatisfied and, in 2002, it elected one anti-immigration member of the Board and in 2003 they elected two more. The reason that it was successful appears to be a function of the organization’s leadership not viewing this small Board minority as relevant. As such, the membership was not alerted to any problem and was largely left unaware of any threat posed by anti-immigration forces (indeed, the leadership was later lambasted by previous leaders for remaining so docile). In the elections in question, less than 10 percent of members voted and no victorious anti-immigration candidate received as much as 50 percent support of those voting, i.e., only about 30,000 members were electing candidates (and, as subsequent results make clear, some certainly didn’t know for whom they were voting).

Things changed in 2004, as the anti-immigration forces tried to win more seats and, essentially, take control of the Board. Many of those favoring endorsing a stricter immigration policy were seen as representing outside interests (rather than the group itself) trying to hijack the group given its reputation, 750,000 members, and \$80-million dollar plus annual budget. At this point, the group’s present and past leaders mobilized to

educate the membership regarding what was happening. The election also got a fair amount of media attention, especially on the West Coast. Predictably, the dissidents were routed. Out of roughly 172,000 votes cast, (almost 23 percent of the membership), no dissident candidate got as many as 16,000 votes and no victorious candidate got less than 110,000 (Table 1). Even with these efforts, there is still evidence of low information—several “fake” candidates whose platform was to urge others to vote for the leadership-approved candidates rather than themselves got numbers in the same range as the anti-immigration candidates. In 2005, an anti-immigration ballot question was defeated with 84 percent against and bylaws were changed by overwhelming majorities so that write-in candidates could not participate and members with less than one year in the group could not run for the Board.

(Table 1 about here)

Thus, if anything, the Sierra Club experience gives us an example of why we do not see much competitive, formal, democracy in practice. As would be expected given the nature of selection, when members were prodded to vote, they showed satisfaction with the status quo by overwhelming majority and they voted against candidates who would be regarded as nuisances threatening the group’s mission. Even with costly efforts to educate, it was still hard to generate high turnout levels and, of those who did vote, many were still with little or no knowledge.

Rather than being the product of democratic procedures, group goals, in turn, are thought to be heavily influenced by the size, and conditional nature, of contributions. Thus, for example, Rothenberg (1992) indicates that, as in the case of the Sierra Club’s preference for neutrality on immigration, leaders will typically not want to adopt goals

that split the organization. Conditional on not alienating the rank and file, changes to the objectives that an NGO pursues should typically represent the preferences of those who give more to the group and who are viewed as more likely to withdraw their contributions, as well as, perhaps, the preferences of leaders themselves.

Political Scientists have especially studied this issue with respect to patrons, in particular whether such supporters seek to tie the NGO's hands as a condition for resources. For example, Lowry (1999) finds that while company sponsored foundation support (as the company is trying to purchase goodwill) is not designed to bind NGOs, resources from other patrons are likely to be conditional on the patrons in question remaining satisfied with NGO choices.²¹ In many cases, of course, patrons contribute for a specific program (for example, Table 2 shows some of the different program-specific grants—many from the same Foundation—obtained by the World Wildlife Foundation in 2005). Regardless of whether a patron explicitly dictates specific goals or not, evidence suggests that strategic leaders consider the possibility of what will happen if the patron in question is not satisfied and there is no easily found source of replacement funds available.

(Table 2 about here)

²¹ Interestingly, however, one of charges laid on the Nature Conservancy by the *Washington Post* articles mentioned earlier was that the group's affiliations with business interests kept it out of certain issue areas, such as concerns about global warming.

Organizational Maintenance: Establishing a Niche

[T]he major response of most organizations to competition over shared niche space is partitioning so that they have an exclusive set of members, funds, issues, or modes of access to the political process. (Lowery and Brasher 2004, p. 58)

As already mentioned and as the above quote implies, Political Scientists, particularly those studying environmental NGOs, have also focused on the efforts of these groups to maintain themselves by establishing their own competitive niche as a means of organizational maintenance. To reiterate, many proponents of this view have started with the belief that there are NGO niches with carrying capacities. However, one need not see the world through such Biological lenses to believe that NGOs may need to differentiate their product in terms of their ideology, tactics, and policy foci.

Minimally, there are numerous case studies detailing how environmental NGOs have reinvented themselves in a manner following this logic (e.g., Bosso 2005). Indeed, as foreshadowed with respect to mobilization, Political Science emphasizes that environmental NGOs have indeed diversified themselves over time with respect to their ideological bent, the non-market tactics that they adopt, and the issues on which they focus (e.g., Rothenberg 2002). Ideologically, some groups are recognized as rather moderate and willing to compromise, while others are more extreme and often perceived as more rigid (a stance which can create internal problems when the group is forced to compromise to achieve political solutions). In terms of tactics, environmental groups range from those employing relatively non-confrontational means (e.g., Environmental Law Institute), to those engaging in conventional techniques such as lobbying (e.g.,

Sierra Club), to those relying on extremely aggressive actions (e.g., Greenpeace)—with many variants in between. Also, within the realm of non-market choices (which Political Scientists almost completely focus on), there are a great variety of differences in terms of venue. For example, in the American federal and separation of powers system, there are groups focusing on all levels of government and those which concentrate on the courts, the bureaucracy, and the legislature. While some of the reasons for these changes may be decisions by political institutions themselves (e.g., the wide expansion of standing in the U.S. Court system springs to mind), much of this appears to be a function of efforts of groups to differentiate themselves (Bosso 2005). With respect to issues, while there are a few groups that are, more or less, full service NGOs (e.g., the Sierra Club), the vast majority have an area of specialization, be it conservation, species preservation, the protection of the oceans, and the like (even a cursory look at Table 3, which shows a recent list of environmental NGOs with Washington offices, demonstrates this). Thus, the expansion of the group universe has, in many ways, mirrored that of governmental environmental intervention.

(Table 3 about here)

Thus, there is near unanimous agreement among Political Scientists that the ability of NGOs to establish organizational niches is a key reason why NGO numbers have not greatly waxed and waned depending upon whether environmental issues are in vogue or not. To reiterate, some of this increasing diversification may be a function of, as well as perhaps a cause of, increasing levels of, and diversifying approaches to, government intervention in dealing with environmental concerns. Conversely, the small numbers of groups that seemingly refuse to be nimble, such as Environmental Action, are

those that have disappeared from the landscape. Although there may be a steady-state carrying capacity at any given point in time as some scholars argue (e.g., Gray and Lowry 1996), with respect to environmental NGOs the size and diversity of these niches seem to have increased considerably.

Despite studies of the correlation between government expansion and NGO numbers, what Political Scientists have not well-established is whether the growth and diversification of NGOs is driven by a greater chance of influencing outcomes, i.e., almost all emphasis has been on maintenance. Put differently, while diversification is typically seen as matching the preferences of those who are likely to provide resources, given a worry that such contributors will not support those NGOs which they regard as a bad match, what is not well understood is whether actual opportunities to be influential are driving such choices.

Summary: Organizations and Goals

What this discussion of goals, organization, and maintenance all indicate is that, implicitly or explicitly, Political Scientists have linked relevant leadership choices to the prerequisite of raising resources in light of free riding incentives, competition from other political NGOs, and other political and economic circumstances. Hence, a group's structure, its aspirations, and its means of choosing leadership and goals, have all been linked to the basic requirements of group maintenance that are created from the moment an NGO enters the political scene. Whether the result is an NGO universe well-situated to be politically influential is the major remaining issue.

Tactics and Influence

As noted, the final concerns that Political Scientists typically deal with involve whether NGOs influence public policy. This, in turn, directs attention to the tactics that they adopt from a different perspective than that taken by those concerned with organizational maintenance—assuming that organizational structure, staff, resources, issues of interest, and ideological positions are fixed, which venues do environmental NGOs shop at?

Although not frequently phrased this way, the key concern here for the perspective of our discussion is whether the constraints imposed by the need for mobilization and maintenance potentially undermine the ability of NGOs to be influential. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios where the needs to raise funds and to otherwise maintain the NGO results in the pursuit of goals and the adoption of tactics for which the NGO lacks a competitive advantage. For example, if low salience issues where groups possess valuable private information are those most subject to NGO influence (e.g., Dur and Bièvre 2007), will NGOs focus on these issues and adopt tactics that do not draw attention even if these issues and tactics are not attractive to those providing resources that might be withdrawn?

As already mentioned, Political Scientists have found that the resource levels and structural features of organizations do correlate with the tactics that are adopted.²² What

²² There is a tendency in the literature to claim that we are witnessing causal linkages; however, in most of these instances it is hard to argue that there is no endogeneity. For example, a group's federated structure may lead to the adoption of certain tactics, such as

these analyses do not definitively show is whether these constrained choices limit NGO effectiveness.

The answer to this ultimate question of influence is hotly debated. Broadly, Political Science research on this issue can be divided into two or three categories. First, there is descriptive research, often case study driven, which tends to suggest that environmental NGOs are very influential.²³ Illustratively, in his monograph on the policy impacts of citizen groups in the United States, Berry (1999) argues that liberal citizen groups have had a fundamental effect on public policy, with environmental NGOs being the most successful:

The mobilization of resources and their conversion into political assets by liberal citizen groups has had a profound effect on the political agenda.

The clearest case is in environmental politics. . . Advantages once held exclusively by business must now be shared with citizen lobbies. (Berry 1999, p. 156)

grassroots lobbying (e.g., Kollman 1998), or the desire to employ these tactics may lead to the creation of a federated structure. Thus, in this discussion, I emphasize correlation and not causation because we lack the ability to distinguish causal paths.

²³ However, not all case study research suggests that groups are potent. For example, Trommer and Chari (2006) explain much lobbying of the Council of Europe as a function of groups gravitating to a place that is ideologically welcoming and consistent with their policy image.

However, in his analysis, Berry essentially examines broad trends in the consideration of so-called post-materialist issues on the political agenda rather than specifically showing that the intervention of an environmental NGO changes outcomes from what they would otherwise be. Results such as these are no more than suggestive.

Second, there are those who develop databases with many observations but use indirect or perceptual measures of group influence.²⁴ As an example of the employment of indirect measures, for example, Baumgartner and Mahoney (2005) focus on the strong temporal correlation between pertinent legislative hearings and the number of environmental NGOs (what they call social movement organizations) in the United States and imply that this suggests that environmental NGOs are quite influential. But such a correlation is again suggestive at best and the causal link between NGO activity and the political agenda may be reversed from that implied. It is perfectly conceivable that, as politicians decide to deal with environmental issues because of changes in the state of the world, then groups mobilize in response.

An example of using a perceptual measure of influence is found in recent work by Han *et al.* (Han, Andrews, Ganz, Baggetta, and Lim 2006; see also Mahoney 2007) on the Sierra Club, where perceptions of influence among 182 different local Sierra Club organizations are measured by asking executive committee chairs about their chapter's efficacy. It is found that group electoral and conservation programs are the strongest indicators of perceptions of political influence. However, it seems questionable whether perceptions of influence can be accepted as accurate and there are problems in

²⁴ Of course, as long as the dependent variable has variance, such measures implicitly assume influence exists and the only question is what explains it.

interpreting causality, as it is hard to imagine a leader structuring her chapter's organization and resource allocation to try to influence outcomes and then suggesting that the chapter is not being influential.

Finally, although only a small number concentrate on environmental issues specifically, there are efforts to focus on actual behavior net of perceptions. For example, do bureaucrats issue more environmentally favorable rulings, do legislators vote in a more pro-environmental manner, or do judges rule in a more environmentally progressive manner, in the wake of efforts by NGOs to influence them? In Political Science, such efforts are generally associated with the provision of information (e.g., Lohmann 1998, 2003), either about the electoral or technical impacts of policy choices, particularly given that NGOs do not provide much in terms of direct financial contributions to politicians (e.g., campaign contributions; but, on the changing role of environmental NGOs in elections, see Duffy 2003).

The problem when these results are viewed as a body of literature is that the findings are variable, with a tendency to show that NGO efforts are not particularly potent (e.g., Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003). Studies of this genre dealing with efforts by environmental NGOs per se would reinforce the inference that, despite the sometimes claims of dramatic victories by NGO leaders, the efforts of such groups are only influential at the margins (Rothenberg 2002).

There are several possible explanations, not necessarily mutually exclusive, for such a lack of consistent effect. One is simply that political decision-makers have many other influences on their choice behavior, most notably the electorate and other political principals, and so all that we can expect is a marginal effect. Another is that we may not

be capturing the important impacts that NGOs have because of theoretical or empirical shortfalls. For example, difficulties in ascertaining the gaming between political officials, environmental NGOs, and other societal interests may obscure the influence process. Analogously, it is certainly the case that we are not able to capture the provision of information very well. And, it is very well-known that social scientists have a tremendous difficulty in assessing the impact of money when it is provided.²⁵

Finally, it may be that maintenance considerations are key for many issues being selected for attention environmental NGOs. In other words, organizational survival and prosperity rather than potential for policy impact may be a selection criterion.²⁶ For example, if the World Wildlife Fund decides to mount a campaign to get the United States government to act on issues of global warming, because this is what large-scale contributors want and the rank-and-file are overwhelmingly in agreement that policy toward global warming must become more vigorous, can we truly expect it to be effective? We know that individuals already believe that government should do something about global warming, so the group's educative role may be questioned. The group can try and influence the citizenry to vote or otherwise mobilize on the basis of global warming, but evidence of environmentally-driven voting is very weak (e.g., Gruber 2003), which should undermine the effectiveness of mobilization as well. Or the Fund can attempt to offer specialized information on the costs of global warming or on

²⁵ It is possible to imagine using experimental protocols to examine some of these concerns, although external validity may be an issue.

²⁶ This logic is similar to that I offered regarding the citizen group Common Cause (Rothenberg 1992)

solutions, but is there any reason to think that it has a competitive advantage in this regard relative to scientists, engineers, and government bureaucrats who are also offering their opinions?²⁷

Put differently, as Lowery (2007) has recently argued in a broad overview of lobbying, “non-instrumental” reasons for lobbying, including efforts to secure an NGO’s membership or resource base, may be critical explanations. As he puts it (pp. 53-54), “lobbying is far more uncertain, far more socially determined, often less simply instrumental than is [typically depicted].” While this does not mean that NGO leaders are callously pursuing issues on which their group can not be influential, their efforts may be constrained.²⁸

Extending the Boundaries of Political Science

Having noted how Political Scientists approach everything from organizational mobilization to influence, I would like to conclude my substantive discussion briefly with what additionally, at least conceptually, Political Scientists might think about with respect to environmental NGOs. In particular, I would emphasize two issues, both of which essentially focus on the strategic choice of venues by NGOs: (1) transboundary efforts, in which NGOs may choose where to direct their energies; and (2) the adoption of market, rather than non-market, strategies to pursue goals.

²⁷ There may be more nuanced things that the Fund can do to help, such as organize coalitions or media outreach. Admittedly, it is hard to measure the direct impact of such choices on policy outputs.

²⁸ Also, there may be a self-selection of leaders, with those who believe that their efforts are not significantly changing policy pursuing alternative career paths.

Transboundary Efforts. It is well-accepted that environmental problems are increasingly global and that the world's economy, as measured by trade flows or the number of multinationals, increasingly crosses national boundaries. It is also well-known that there are environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund, which operate in various nations. And, certainly, business scholars who have been concerned with strategic choices have pointed out that non-market actors may choose different national stages depending on where they thought they would be most effective (e.g., Baron 2006). Yet, one recent review of the literature concludes that, "In general, however, the literature on international environmental lobbying tends to be strong on polemic and weak on theoretical and empirical grounding" (Diven 2004, p. 349; but see Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002; Sasser, Prakash, Cashore, and Auld 2006).

Although difficult to operationalize empirically beyond case studies, it would seem possible that additional insights could be garnered by examining strategic venue choices of NGOs when the feasible set crosses national boundaries. Political Scientists could bring some additional purchase on issues of transboundary choices by incorporating some of their traditional concerns with organizational mobilization and maintenance. For example, might the increasing potential of NGO's to nimbly cross national boundaries be constrained by needs for organizational resources and maintenance? Is it possible to convince those who furnish funds that the NGO is being successful, even though the locus of that success is thousands of miles away? Although admittedly speculative, it would seem quite plausible to believe that the ability to

implement a transboundary strategy and organizational maintenance and resource considerations might conflict.

Market Strategies. While Political Scientists have spent a great deal of time noting the gradual expansion of NGO tactics over time and increasing non-market venue shopping, they have by and large not moved to incorporate the alternative of turning to the market by incorporating what Baron (e.g., 2001, 2003; Hendry 2006) has aptly labeled private politics. As is well known, such market strategies are themselves varied, ranging from staging confrontational events, to educative efforts, to mounting boycotts, to forging collaborations with those whom they are trying to influence.

It is not surprising that, with rare exceptions (e.g., Vogel 2005), Political Scientists tend to have professional blinders on, in the sense that their natural inclination is to consider what environmental NGOs do with respect to government. For example, to return to the subject of climate change, the standard response of Political Scientists would be to examine what environmental NGOs are doing in appealing to various places in the American national government, state governments, the EU or its member nation-states, and the like. They would tend to ignore the possibility that NGOs will deal more or less directly with the producers of greenhouse gases, relying only upon appeals to government entities as a potential threat that might be wielded in the face of corporate or industry intransigence.

Certainly we see numerous examples of market tactics in the current world today. As mentioned, there are openly hostile confrontations, such as the classic case of Shell, Greenpeace, and the Brent Spar (Jordan 2001), or the Rainforest Action Network's efforts with respect to Citigroup that Baron and Yurday (2004a,b) have profiled, as well

as numerous examples of boycotts. There are also more conciliatory efforts involving major mainstream NGOs, such as Environmental Defense's (an NGO that has rebranded itself in terms of market tactics) and the Natural Resources Defense Council's 2007 decision to cooperate with the \$45 billion purchase of Texas energy giant TXU in exchange for pledges such as a reduction in new coal plant construction and investments in wind energy. Similarly, and despite its virulent opposition to the TXU deal, around the same time, the Sierra Club announced a deal with Kansas City Power & Light to deal with carbon dioxide being produced by a new plant that the utility was constructing. Yet, such events receive only casual attention from the vast majority of Political Scientists studying environmental NGOs.

For Political Scientists, many of the same kinds of questions that concern them about non-market actions may be asked about choosing markets. How easy is it for groups to mobilize around issues for which market tactics are most effective? How do issues of group maintenance come into play if a group decides to cooperate with environmental bad guys, e.g., how do patrons feel about funding such activities? Will the needs for maintenance constrain what market targets are chosen and which tactics are employed? How do we assess the overall effectiveness of market techniques beyond in-depth case studies?

Final Thoughts

It is difficult to summarize the relevant literature from a diverse profession such as Political Science. Nonetheless, a strong case can be made that where Political Science is strongest with respect to environmental NGOs is documenting the steps that have been taken to deal with issues of mobilization and maintenance and suggesting how they may

impact influence. Political Scientists have shown how leaders are able to create and sustain organizations and have persuasively indicated how these features play into organizational structures and goals. They have also raised the possibility that organizational resource, maintenance, and goal formation processes might limit or condition NGO influence.

Conversely, most Political Science directs our attention away from some dynamic changes occurring in the real world. Not only is the increasing internationalization of the world economy and associated environmental problems not given very much attention, but the possible use of private politics instead as a substitute for, or a complement of, non-market actions is not greatly appreciated. Of course, it is easy to suggest such deficiencies, but remedying them constitutes a very formidable task indeed.

References

- Ainsworth, Scott H. 2000. "Modeling Political Efficacy and Interest Group Membership," *Political Behavior* 22: 89-108.
- Ainsworth, Scott H. 2002. *Analyzing Interest Groups: Group Influence on People and Policies*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, John de Figueriedo, and James M. Snyder. 2003. "Why is there so Little Money in U.S. Politics," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17: 105-130.
- Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. 1996. "Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying," *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 543-545.
- Barbieri, Stefano, and Andrea Mattozzi. 2004. "Membership in Citizen Groups." Social Science Working Paper 1206, California Institute of Technology.
- Baron, David P. 2001. "Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy," *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy* 10: 7-45.
- Baron, David P. 2003. "Private Politics," *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy* 12: 31-66.
- Baron, David P. 2006. *Business and its Environment*, 5th ed. Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Baron, David P., and Daniel Diermeier. Forthcoming. "Strategic Activism and Non-market Strategy," *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*.
- Baron, David P., and Erin Yurday. 2004a. "Anatomy of a Corporate Campaign: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup." Case P-42A,B,C. Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.

- Baron, David P., and Erin Yurday. 2004b. "Strategic Activism: The Rainforest Action Network." Case P-44. Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. *Agendas and Stability in American Politics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1996a. "Good Theory Deserves Good Data," *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 565-567.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1996b. "The Multiple Ambiguities of Counteractive Lobbying," *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 521-523.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and Political Science*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 2004. "The Origin, Maintenance, Organization, and Mortality of Interest Groups," in Clive S. Thomas, ed., *Research Guide to U.S. and International Interest Groups*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Christine Mahoney. 2005. "Social Movements, the Rise of New Issues, and the Public Agenda," in David S. Meyer, Valerie Jenness, and Helen Ingram, eds. *Routing the Opposition: Social Movements, Public Policy, and Democracy*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Berry, Jeffrey M. 1977. *Lobbying for the People: The Political Behavior of Interest Groups*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Berry, Jeffrey M. 1999. *The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups*.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Berry, Jeffrey M., and Clyde Wilcox. 2007. *The Interest Group Society*. New York,
NY: Pearson Longman.
- Birchard, Bill. 2005. *Nature's Keepers: The Remarkable Story of how the Nature
Conservancy Became the Largest Environmental Group in the World*. New York,
NY: Jossey-Bass.
- Bosso, Christopher J. 2003. "Rethinking the Concept of Membership in Nature
Advocacy Organizations," *Policy Studies Journal* 31: 397-411.
- Bosso, Christopher J. 2004. "Environmental Interest Groups," in Clive S. Thomas, ed.,
Research Guide to U.S. and International Interest Groups. Westport, CT:
Praeger.
- Bosso, Christopher J. 2005. *Environment, Inc.: From Grassroots to Beltway*.
Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
- Bosso, Christopher J., and Michael Thomas Collins. 2002. "Just another Tool? How
Environmental Groups use the Internet," in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A.
Loomis, eds. *Interest Group Politics*, 6^h Ed. Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly Press.
- Cigler, Allan J., and Anthony J. Nownes. 1995. "Public Interest Entrepreneurs and
Group Patrons," in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. *Interest Group
Politics*, 4^h Ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Dalton, Russell J. 1994. *The Green Rainbow: Environmental Groups in Western
Europe*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Dalton, Russell J. 2005. "The Greening of the Globe? Cross-national Levels of Environmental Group Membership," *Environmental Politics* 14: 441-459.
- Diven, Polly J. 2004. "Interest Groups in International and Transnational Politics," in Clive S. Thomas, ed., *Research Guide to U.S. and International Interest Groups*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Duffy, Robert J. 2003. *The Green Agenda in American Politics: New Strategies for the Twenty-first Century*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
- Dur, Andreas and Dirk de Bièvre. 2007. "The Question of Interest Group Influence," *Journal of Public Policy* 27: 1-12.
- Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1996. *The Population Ecology of Interest Group Representation: Lobbying Communities in the American States*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 2004. "A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests," *Political Research Quarterly* 57: 163-175.
- Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 2001. *Special Interest Politics*. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
- Grossmann, Matt. 2006a. "Environmental Advocacy in Washington: A Comparison with Other Interest Groups," *Environmental Politics* 15: 628-638.
- Grossmann, Matt. 2006b. "The Organization of Factions: Interest Mobilization and the Group Theory of Politics," *Public Organization Review* 6: 107-124.
- Guber, Deborah Lynn. 2003. *The Grassroots of a Green Revolution: Polling America on the Environment*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Guth, James L., John C. Green, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and Corwin E. Smidt. "Faith and the Environment: Religious Beliefs and Attitudes on Environmental Policy," *American Journal of Political Science* 1995: 364-382.
- Hall, Richard L., and Alan V. Deardoff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy," *American Political Science Review* 100: 69-84.
- Han, Hahrie, Kenneth T. Andrews, Marshall Ganz, Matthew Baggetta, and Chaeyoon Lim. 2006. "Leadership, Organization, and Action: Explaining the Public Influence of Civic Associations." Unpublished manuscript.
- Hansen, John Mark. 1985. "The Political Economy of Group Membership," *American Political Science Review* 79: 79-96.
- Heaney, Michael T. 2006. "Lobbying Coalitions as Informally Organized Coalitions within U.S. Congressional Parties." Unpublished manuscript.
- Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert H. Salisbury. 1993. *The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hendry, Jamie R. "Taking Aim at Business: What Factors Lead Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations to Target Particular Firms," *Business & Society* 45: 47-86.
- Johnson, Paul E. 1987. "Foresight and Myopia in Organizational Membership," *Journal of Politics* 49: 678-703.
- Johnson, Paul E. 1990. "Unraveling in Democratically Governed Groups," *Rationality and Society* 2: 4-34.

- Johnson, Paul E. 1998. "Interest Group Recruiting: Finding Members and Keeping Them," in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. *Interest Group Politics*, 5th Ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Jordan, Grant. 2001. *Shell, Greenpeace and Brent Spar*. New York, NY: Palgrave.
- Jordan, Grant, and William Maloney. 1997. *The Protest Business? Mobilizing Campaign Groups*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond Borders*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kim, Jaehoon, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2007. "Lobbying, Information, and Delegation." Unpublished manuscript.
- Kollman, Ken. 1998. *Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion & Interest Group Strategies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ladd, Everett Carl, and Karlyn H. Bowman. 1995. *Attitudes toward the Environment: Twenty-five Years after Earth Day*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- Lohmann, Susanne. 1998. "An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests," *American Political Science Review*, 92: 809-827.
- Lohmann, Susanne. 2003. "Representative Government and Special Interest Politics (We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us)," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 15: 299-319.
- Lowery, David. 2007. "Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying," *Polity* 39: 29-54.

- Lowery, David, and Holly Brasher. 2004. *Organized Interests and American Government*. Boston, MA: McGraw Hill.
- Lowery, David, and Virginia Gray. 1995. "The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural Regulation of Interest Groups in the American States," *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 1-29.
- Lowery, David, and Virginia Gray. 2004. "A Neopluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests," *Political Research Quarterly* 57: 163-175.
- Lowry, Robert C. 1997. "The Private Production of Public Goods: Organization Maintenance, Managers' Objectives, and Collective Goods," *American Political Science Review* 91: 308-323.
- Lowry, Robert C. 1998. "Religion and the Demand for Membership in Environmental Citizen Groups," *Public Choice* 94: 223-240.
- Lowry, Robert C. 1999. "Foundation Patronage toward Citizen Groups and Think Tanks: Who Get Grants?," *Journal of Politics* 61: 758-776.
- Lubell, Mark. 2002. "Environmental Activism as Collective Action," *Environment and Behavior* 34: 431-454.
- Lubell, Mark, Arnold Velditz, Sammy Zahran, and Letitia T. Alston. 2006. "Collective Action, Environmental Activism, and Air Quality Policy," *Political Research Quarterly* 59: 149-160.
- Lyon, Thomas P., and John W. Maxwell. 2004. "Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy," *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy* 13: 561-597.
- Mahoney, Christine. 2004. "The Power of Institutions: State and Interest Group Activity in the European Union," *European Union Politics* 5: 441-466.

- Mahoney, Christine. 2005. *Advocacy in the United States and the European Union*.
PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University.
- Mahoney, Christine. 2007. "Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union," *Journal of Public Policy* 27: 35-56.
- Mahoney, Christine, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2004. "The Determinants and Effects of Interest-Group Coalitions." Unpublished manuscript.
- Martin, Glen. 2004. "Board Election Divides Sierra Club: Environmentalists Renew Bitter Fight Over Controlling U.S. Immigration," *San Francisco Chronicle*, Feb. 11th, p.A1.
- McFarland, Andrew S. 2004. *Neopluralism: The Evolution of Political Process Theory*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
- Meyerson, Frederick A.B. 2004. "Policy View: Immigration, Population Policy, and the Sierra Club," *Population and the Environment* 26: 61-69.
- Miller, Joanne M., and Jon A. Krosnick. 2004. "Threat as a Motivator of Political Activism: A Field Experiment," *Political Psychology* 25: 507-523.
- Moe, Terry M. 1980. *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Organized Interest Groups*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Moe, Terry M., and Michael Caldwell. 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Governments—A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 150: 171-195.
- Nownes, Anthony J. 2001. *Pressure and Power: Organized Interests in American Politics*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

- Nownes, Anthony J. 2004. "The Population Ecology of Interest Group Formation: Mobilizing for Gay and Lesbian Rights in the United States, 1950-98," *British Journal of Political Science* 34: 49-67.
- Nownes, Anthony J., and Allan J. Cigler. 2007. "Big Money Donors to Environmental Groups: What they Give and What they Get," in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. *Interest Group Politics*, 7th Ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Nownes, Anthony J., and Daniel Lipinski. 2005. "The Population Ecology of Interest Group Death: Gay and Lesbian Rights Interest Groups in the United States, 1945-98," *British Journal of Political Science* 35: 303-319.
- Nownes, Anthony J., and Grant Neeley. 1996a. "Public Interest Group Entrepreneurship and Theories of Group Mobilization," *Political Research Quarterly* 49: 119-146.
- Nownes, Anthony J., and Grant Neeley. 1996b. "Toward an Explanation for Public Interest Group Formation and Proliferation: "Seed Money," Disturbances, Entrepreneurship, and Patronage," *Policy Studies Journal* 24: 74-92.
- Reiser, Dana Brakman. 2006. "Nonprofit Takeovers: Regulating the Market for Mission Control," *Brigham Young University Law Review* 2006: 1181-1253.
- Repetto, Robert, editor. 2006. *Punctuated Equilibrium and the Dynamics of U.S. Environmental Policy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Rohrschneider, Robert, and Russell J. Dalton. 2002. "A Global Network? Transnational Cooperation among Environmental Groups," *Journal of Politics* 64: 510-533.
- Rothenberg, Lawrence S. 1992. *Linking Citizens to Government: Interest Group Politics at Common Cause*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Rothenberg, Lawrence S. 2002. *Environmental Choices: Policy Responses to Green Demands*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Sabatier, Paul A., and Susan M. McLaughlin. 1990. "Belief Congruence between Interest-Group Leaders and Members: An Empirical Analysis of Three Theories and a Suggested Synthesis," *Journal of Politics* 52: 915-935.
- Salisbury, Robert. 1969. "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13: 1-32.
- Sesser, Erika, Aseem Prakash, Benjamin Cashore, and Graeme Auld. 2006. "Direct Targeting as an NGO Political Strategy: Examining Private Authority Regimes in the Forestry Sector," *Business and Politics* 18:
<http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol18/iss3/art1>.
- Schoenbrod, David. 2005. *Saving our Environment from Washington: How Congress Grabs Power, Shirks Responsibility, and Shortchanges the People*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Shaiko, Ronald G. 1999. *Voices and Echoes for the Environment: Public Interest Representation in the 1990s and Beyond*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Trommer, Silke M., and Raj S. Chari. 2006. "The Council of Europe: Interest Groups and Ideological Missions?" *West European Politics* 29: 665-686.
- Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Knopf.
- Vogel, David. 2005. *The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Walker, Jack L. 1991. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

**Table 1:
Sierra Club Board of Directors Election Results (2004)**

<i>Elected</i>	<i>Votes</i>
Renstrom	141,407
O'Connell	132,262
Aumen	123,622
Ranchod	123,332
Karpf	110,756
<i>SUSPS Candidates (Anti-immigration)</i>	
Van de Hoek	15,700
Pimnetel	14,527
Lamm	13,090
McCoy	9,765
Morris	8,247
<i>"Fake" Candidates</i>	
Berry	15,492
Dees	7,554
Herz	7,525
<i>Other Runners-up</i>	
Dorsey	42,401
Dobson	35,825
Hanson	29,104
Strickler	8,333

Source: http://www.susps.org/info/election_results.html

**Table 2:
Program-Specific Foundation Grants Received by World Wildlife Foundation, 2005**

<i>Foundation</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	\$575,000	Marine Conservation Program
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	423,000	Establish Aquaculture Stewardship Council
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	200,000	Conservation in Gulf of California
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	150,000	Sustainable Fisheries
W.K. Kellogg Foundation	101,200	HIV/AIDS in Lesotho
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	100,000	Science Innovation Program
Hugh A McAllister, Jr. Charitable Foundation	100,000	Conservation Efforts
Pattee Foundation	75,000	Cancer Research End Services
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	50,000	Fisheries Management in Mexico
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	39,600	Develop a Change Strategy for WWF International

Source: www.capitalresearch.org

**Table 3:
Environmental Groups with Offices in Washington in 2004**

<p>African Wildlife Foundation Alaska Wilderness League Alliance to Save Energy American Bird Conservatory American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy American Fisheries Society American Forest Foundation American Rivers Americans for Balanced Energy Choices Beyond Pesticides Breakthrough Technologies Institute Campaign for America's Wilderness Carrying Capacity Network Center for Clean Air Policy Center for Energy and Economic Development Center for Health, Environment and Justice Center for Marine Conservation Center for Sea Change Clean Air Trust Clean Water Action Clean Water Network Climate Institute Climate Policy Center Coal Utilization Research Council Coast Alliance Concern, Inc Conservation Fund Conservation International Consumer Aerosol Products Council Council for a Livable World Critical Mass Energy & Environment Program Defenders of Wildlife Ducks Unlimited Earth Share EarthJustice EarthVoice Ecological Society of America Environment2004 Environmental and Energy Study Institute Environmental Defense Environmental Information Association Environmental Law Institute Environmental Working Group Friends of the Earth Green Seal Greenpeace</p>	<p>Institute for Conservation Leadership Izaak Walton League of America League of Conservation Voters Methanol Institute Mineral Policy Center National Association for Environmental Management National Audubon Society National Council for Science and the Environment National Environmental Policy Institute National Environmental Trust National Fisheries Institute National Forest Recreation Association National Park Foundation National Park Trust National Parks Conservation Association National Pollution Prevention Roundtable National Water Resources Association National Wetlands Coalition National Wilderness Institute National Wildlife Federation National Wildlife Refuge Association Natural Resources Defense Council Nature Conservancy Negative Population Growth Ocean Conservancy Oceana Pew Center on Global Climate Change Population Action International Population Association of America Population Connection Population Institute Population Reference Bureau Population Resource Center Population-Environment Balance Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility Rachel Carson Council Rails to Trails Conservancy Renew the Earth Renewable Natural Resources Foundation Resources for the Future Save America's Forests Sierra Club Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership Trust for Public Land Union of Concerned Scientists Unions for Jobs and the Environment</p>
<p>Source: Grossmann (2006a)</p>	